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Physician-Assisted
Suicide

The fallowing essay is a
shorter version of an article
that is being published in
the October 1996 issue
of Issues in Law and
Medicine. That article in
turn is based on a talk given
at the 1996 Annual Meeting
of the American Psychiatric
Association in May at
New York.

It would be hard to deny that there is
a great deal of support in this country and ever-growing support - for
legalizing physician-assisted suicide
(PAS). Why is this so? I believe there are
a considerable number of reasons. I shall
discuss five common reasons - and
explain why I do not find any of them
convincing.

Why so many
people support
Physician-Assisted
Suicide

I.
The compelling force of
heartrending individual cases
Many people, understandably, are
greatly affected by the heartwrenching
facts of individual cases, e.g., a person
enduring the last stages of A.LS. ("Lou
Gehrig's disease"), who gasps: "I want ...
I want. .. to die." In this regard the
media, quite possibly inadvertently,
advances the cause of PAS.
A reporter often thinks that the way to
provide in-depth coverage of the subject
of assisted suicide and euthanasia is to
provide a detailed account of a particular
person suffering from a particular disease
and asking: "How can we deny this
person the active intervention of another
to bring about death?" Or "What would
you want done if you were in this
persons shoes?"
But we should not let a compelling
individual case blot out more general
considerations. The issue is not simply
what seems best for the individual who is
the focal point of a news story, but what
seems best for society as a whole.
Every one interested in the subject of
PAS and active voluntary euthanasia
(AVE) has heard emotional stories about
people suffering great pain and begging
for someone to kill them or help them
bring about their death. But people like
Kathleen Foley, the Memorial SloanKettering Cancer Centers renowned pain
control expert, and Herbert Hendin, the
American Suicide Foundations executive
director, can tell very moving stories, too
- stories militating against the

And why

these reasons
are not
convincing
-
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legalization of PAS and AVE. They can tell
us how suicidal ideation and suicide
requests commonly dissolve with
adequate control of pain and other
symptoms - or how, for example, after
much conversation with a caring
physician, a suicidal patient - one who
would have qualified for PAS if the
procedure had been legal - changed his
mind, how his desperation subsided, and
how he used the remaining months of his
life to become closer to his wife and
parents.
I can hear the cries of protest now. Let
terminally ill people (and perhaps others
as well) do what they want. They're not
bothering anybody else. Letting them do
what they want won't affect anybody else.
But I am afraid it will. We are not
merely a collection of isolated individuals;
we are connected to each other in many
different ways. Therefore, PAS and AVE
are social issues and matters of public
policy
Suppose a healthy septuagenarian,
who has struggled to overcome the
hardships of poverty all his life, wants to
assure that his two grandchildren have a
better life than he did. So he decides he
will sell his heart for $500,000 and
arrange to have a trust fund established
for his grandchildren. This does not
strike me as an irrational or senseless act.
But would "society" allow this transaction
to take place? I think not. But why not?
How can a prohibition against selling
one's body parts be reconciled with the
view that we have full autonomy over our
lives and our bodies?
It is noteworthy, I believe, that
although, when it issued its report in
1994, the New York Task Force on Life
and the Law recognized that PAS or AVE
"may be morally acceptable in
exceptional cases," all of its twenty-four
members concluded that compelling
exceptional cases did not justify changing
the law governing assisted suicide and
voluntary euthanasia.
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But we should not let a
compelling individual
case blot out more
general considerations.
The issue is not simply
what seems best for the
individual who is the
focal point ...

Late last year, a member of the Task
Force, philosopher and bioethicist John
Arras, looked back on his work on the
project and recalled that he and his
colleagues were deeply moved by the
sufferings of some patients, but that all
twenty-four members were ultimately
convinced that these patients "could not
be helped in a public way," that is to say,
could not be given publicly-sanctioned
assistance in committing suicide, without
endangering a far greater number of
highly vulnerable patients.
Professor Arras noted that he and the
other members of the Task Force were
painfully aware that whether they
maintained the total prohibition against
PAS and AVE or whether they lifted the
ban for any group of patients, "there were
bound to be victims." He added: "The
victims of the current policy are easy to
identify; they are on the news, the talk
shows and the documentaries, and often
on Dr. Kevorkian'.s roster of 'patients.' But
who would be the victims of a more
permissive policy?"
Professor Arras then maintained, as
had the Task Force, that whatever criteria
and procedures for justifiable PAS and
AVE are ultimately chosen, "abuse of the
system is highly likely to follow." If PAS
were legalized, many requests for PAS
would not be sufficiently voluntary given
"the highly predictable failure of most
physicians reliably to diagnose and treat
reversible clinical depression, especially
in the elderly population." As for
exploring all reasonable alternatives to
PAS, "given the abysmal track record of
physicians in responding adequately to
pain and suffering, we can also
confidently predict that in many cases all
reasonable alternatives will not have been
exhausted."
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"Forbidding [assisted suicide] leaves
some citizens with the prospect of being
trapped in agony or indignity from which
they could be delivered by a death they
desire. But permitting such assistance
risks the unwilling or manipulated death
of the most vulnerable members of
society, and the erosion of the normative
structure that encourages them, their
families, and their doctors to choose life."

II.
Objections to legalizing
PAS or AVE are limited
to religious grounds

Professor Arras noted the
inaccessibility of decent primary care to
some 37 million Americans, "the
appalling lack of training in palliative
care" even among cancer specialists, and
discrimination on the basis of race and
economic status in the delivery of pain
control and other medical treatments.
And he voiced serious doubts, as did the
Task Force Report, that any reporting
system would be sufficiently effective to
adequately monitor these practices. For as
the Dutch experience has demonstrated,
physicians will be most reluctant to
report instances of PAS and AVE to public
officials, for fear of highlighting these
instances at a time when family privacy is
most needed. The likely result of this lack
of oversight will be the inability of society
to respond appropriately to disturbing
incidents and long-term trends.
I think Professor Seth Kreimer of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School
recently summarized the "fearsome
dilemma" presented by the assisted
suicide issue very well when he observed:

Another reason I think the assisted
suicide-active voluntary euthanasia
movement has made so much headway is
that its proponents have managed to
convince many that the only substantial
objections to their proposals are based on
religious doctrine.
In November of 1994, Measure 16,
the Oregon ballot initiative, was narrowly
approved by the voters and Oregon
became the first state to legalize PAS.
According to press reports, Oregon Right
to Die and other proponents of PAS
hammered away at the Roman Catholic
Church or, a bit vaguely, at those who
"think they have the divine right to
control other peoples lives."
I can only say that, so far as I know,
I have never made a religious objection to
PAS or AVE. Indeed, the primary reason I
first wrote about this subject way back in
1958 was that I strongly disagreed with
the view of British law professor Glanville
Williams, the leading Anglo-American
proponent of active voluntary euthanasia
at the time, who maintained that
"euthanasia can be condemned only
according to a religious opinion." (In
resisting Professor Williams' proposals,
I took pains to call my article "Some
Non-Religious Views Against Proposed
'Mercy-Killing' Legislation.")

I think many people share Professor
Williams' view and that proponents of
PAS and AVE have done their best to
exploit this feeling. But I believe the New
York State Task Force Report is strong
evidence that Glanville Williams and
other proponents of PAS are wrong. The
Report spells out many nonreligious
objections to legalizing PAS, a number of
which were summarized by Professor
Arras, whom I quoted earlier. It was these
nonreligious concerns that led all twentyfour members of the Task Force to reach
the unanimous conclusion that the total
ban against assisted suicide should be
kept intact.

III.
PAS and AVE are facts
of modern life, so we ought to
legalize and regulate them
Another argument for PAS that appeals
to a goodly number of people goes
something like this: A significant number
of physicians have been performing
assisted suicide anyway, so why not
legalize it? Wouldn't it be better to bring
the practice out in the open and to
formulate clear standards than to keep
the practice underground and
unregulated?
It is not at all clear how prevalent the
underground practice is. As Daniel
Callahan (President of the Hastings
Center) and Margot White (a lawyer
specializing in bioethics) have pointed
out in a recent article, however, if it is
truly the case that current laws against
euthanasia (and assisted suicide) are
widely ignored by doctors, "why should
we expect new statutes to be taken with
greater moral and legal seriousness?"
Evidently no physician has ever been
convicted of a crime for helping a
suffering patient die at her request. But,
as Callahan and White ask, why should
we expect that there will be any more
convictions for violating the new laws
than there have been for violating the
laws presently in effect?
What Dr. Herbert Hendin said this

spring in testimony before a Congressional
subcommittee about the impact of
legalizing euthanasia applies to the
legalization of PAS as well: Absent "an
intrusion into the relationship between
patient and doctor that most patients
would not want and most doctors would
not accept," no law or set of guidelines
covering euthanasia (or assisted suicide)
can protect patients. Adds Hendin:
"After euthanasia [or assisted suicide]
has been performed, since only the
patient and the doctor may know the
actual facts of the case, and since only the
doctor is alive to relate them, any
medical, legal, or interdisciplinary review
committee will, as in the Netherlands,
only know what the doctor chooses to
tell them. Legal sanction creates a
permissive atmosphere that seems to
foster not taking the guidelines too
seriously. The notion that those American
doctors - who are admittedly breaking
some serious laws in now assisting in a
suicide - would follow guidelines if
assisted suicide were legalized is not
borne out by the Dutch experience; nor is

it likely given the failure of American
practitioners of assisted suicide to follow
elementary safeguards in cases they have
published."

IV.
There is little difference
between ending life support and
intervening to promote death
This March, in the course of ruling in
a case called Compassion in Dying v.
Washington that mentally competent,
terminally ill patients, at least, have a
constitutionally protected right to assisted
suicide, an 8-3 majority of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (covering
California, Washington, Oregon and
other western states) wrote that it could
see "no ethical or constitutionally
cognizable difference between a doctors
pulling the plug on a respirator and his
prescribing drugs which will permit a
terminally ill patient to end his own life."
According to the Ninth Circuit, the
important thing is that "the death of the
patient is the intended result as surely in
one case as in the other."
The Ninth Circuit found the right to
assisted suicide grounded in the Due
Process Clause. A month later, in a case
called Quill v. Vacca, a three-judge panel
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit (covering New York,
Connecticut and Vermont) struck down

but what seems
best for society
as a whole.
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New Yorks law against assisted suicide on
equal protection grounds. The Second
Circuit was no more impressed with the
alleged distinction between "letting die"
and active intervention to bring about
death than the Ninth circuit had been. It
"seem[ed] clear" to the Second Circuit
that "New York does not treat similarly
circumstanced persons alike: those in the
final stages of terminal illness who are on
life support systems are allowed to hasten
their deaths by directing the removal of
such systems; but those who are similarly
situated, except for being attached to lifesustaining equipment, are not allowed to
[do so]."
The Ninth Circuits due process
analysis would seem to apply to active
voluntary euthanasia as well as PAS. So
would the Second Circuits equal
protection analysis. If persons off life
support systems are similarly situated to
those on such systems, why aren't
terminally ill people who are unable to
perform the last, death-causing act
themselves, but who want the active
intervention of another to bring about
death, similarly situated to terminally ill
people who are able to perform the last,
death-causing act themselves and want to
enlist the assistance of another in
bringing about death?
If a mentally competent, terminally ill
person is determined to end her life with
the active assistance of another, but needs
someone else to administer the lethal
medicine, how can she be denied this
right simply because she cannot perform
the last, death-causing act herself?
Applying the reasoning of the Second

I think both the Ninth and Second
Circuits went awry by lumping together
different kinds of 11 rights to die."
Few slogans are more stirring than the
11 right to die." But few phrases are more
fuzzy, more misleading or
more misunderstood.
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Circuit, wouldn't denial of the latter
persons right constitute - and at this
point I am quoting the very language the
Second Circuit used - a failure to "treat
equally all competent persons who are in
the final stages of fatal illness and wish to
hasten their deaths"?
I think both the Ninth and Second
Circuits went awry by lumping together
different kinds of "rights to die." Few
slogans are more stirring than the "right
to die." But few phrases are more fuzzy,
more misleading or more misunderstood.
The phrase has been used at various
times to refer to (a) the right to refuse or
to terminate unwanted medical treatment,
including life-saving treatment; (b) the
right to assisted suicide, i.e., the right to
obtain another's help in committing
suicide; and (c) the right to active
voluntary euthanasia, i.e., the right to
authorize another to kill you intentionally
and directly:
Until March of this year the only kind
of "right to die" any American appellate
court, state or federal, had ever
established - and the only right or
liberty that the New Jersey Supreme
Court had recognized in the Karen Ann
Quinlan case (1976) and the Supreme
Court had assumed existed in the Nancy
Beth Cruzan case (1990) - was the right
to reject life-sustaining medical treatment
or, as many have called it, the right to die
a natural .death. Indeed, the landmark
Quinlan case had explicitly distinguished
between "letting die" on the one hand
and both direct killing and assisted
suicide on the other.
When all is said and done, both the
Second and Ninth Circuit rulings turn
largely on the courts' failure to keep two
kinds of "rights to die" separate and
distinct - the right to terminate life
support and the right to assisted suicide.
And their failure to do so indicates that,
when faced with the specific issue, they
are unlikely to keep a third kind of "right
to die" separate and distinct - active
voluntary euthanasia.
I believe the Ninth Circuit was quite
wrong when it claimed an inability to
find any "constitutionally cognizable
difference" between a doctors "pulling the
plug" on a terminally ill patient and his
providing a patient with lethal medicine
so that she could commit suicide. I think

the Second Circuit was equally wrong
when it concluded that terminally ill
patients on life-support systems and
those not on such systems are "similarly
situated" or "similarly circumstanced."
The reasons that the cases decided by
the Ninth and Second Circuit are so
difficult is that they involve two
competing doctrines or traditions. The
right to terminate life support grows out
of the doctrine of informed consent, a
doctrine firmly entrenched in American
tort law. The logical corollary of that
doctrine, of course, is the right to reject
medical treatment. The other tradition,
which has continued to exist alongside
the first one, is the anti-suicide tradition.
This is evidenced by society's discouragement of suicide (indeed, by the state's
power to prevent suicide, by force if
necessary) and by the many laws
criminalizing assisted suicide.
In the 1990 Cruzan case, the only
"right to die" case ever decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court up to now, a
majority of the Court, perhaps as many as
eight justices, evidently decided that the
termination of artificial nutrition and
hydration was more consistent with the
rationale of the cases upholding the right
to reject medical treatment. So far as we
can tell, only Justice Scalia, who wrote a
lone concurring opinion, thought the
case implicated the anti-suicide tradition.
Justice Scalia'.s opinion in Cruzan was
almost totally ignored by his colleagues.
The other eight justices all framed the
issue in terms of a right to be free from
"unwanted medical treatment" or, more
specifically, "unwanted artificial nutrition
and hydration." None of them had
anything to say about a "right to suicide."
The Ninth and Second Circuit
opinions to the contrary notwithstanding,
there are a number of important
differences between withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining medical
treatment and active intervention to
promote or to bring about death.
For one thing, the refusal of lifesustaining treatment is an indispensable
part of medical practice. Approximately
70 percent of all hospital and nursing
home deaths follow the refusal of some
form of medical intervention. If society
prohibited the rejection of life-sustaining

treatment, vast numbers of patients
would be at the mercy of every
technological advance in medicine.
Moreover, if people could refuse medical
treatment that might turn out to be
lifesaving, but not discontinue it once
initiated, many would not seek such
treatment in the first place.
In short, letting a patient die at some
point is a practical condition upon the
successful operation of medicine. But the
same cannot be said of PAS or physicianadministered AVE. This is especially so if
patients' pain is adequately treated
(although presently it frequently is not)
and patients understand they have a
right to refuse treatment or to demand
the withdrawal of burdensome treatments
(although presently they often do not).
Not only would a prohibition against
rejecting life-sustaining treatment oppress
many more people than would a ban on
PAS, it would impose a much more
severe burden. The prohibition against
assisted suicide does foreclose an "avenue
of escape," but it does not totally occupy
a persons life or make affirmative use of
his body. To deny a person the right to
terminate life-support, however, is as Yale
Law Professor Jed Rubenfeld has put it, to
force one into "a particular, allconsuming, totally dependent, and
indeed rigidly standardized life: the life of
one confined to a hospital bed, attached
to medical machinery, and tended to by
medical professionals."
To allow a patient to resist unwanted
bodily intrusions by a physician is hardly
the same thing as granting her a right to
determine the time and manner of her
death. The distinction between a right to
refuse medical treatment and the right to
PAS is a comprehensible one and a line
maintained by almost all major AngloAmerican medical associations.
I am well aware that the distinction I
am defending is neither perfectly neat nor
perfectly logical. But what line is? Surely
not the line between those who are
terminally ill and those who will have to

endure what they consider an intolerable
life for a much longer period. Nor the
distinction between assisted suicide and
active voluntary euthanasia.
I believe the line between "letting die"
and actively intervening to bring about
death represents a cultural and pragmatic
compromise between the desire to let
seriously ill people carry out their wishes
to end it all and the felt need to protect
the weak and the vulnerable. On the one
hand, we want to respect patients' wishes,
relieve suffering, and put an end to
seemingly futile medical treatment. Hence
we allow patients to refuse life-sustaining
treatment. On the other hand, we want to
affirm the supreme value of life and to
maintain the salutary principle that the
law protects all human life, no matter
how poor its quality. Hence the ban
against assisted suicide and active
voluntary euthanasia.
I venture to say that one of the
purposes of the distinction between the
termination of life support and assisted
suicide (or active voluntary euthanasia)
- or at least one of its principal effects
- is to have it both ways. The two sets
of values are in conflict, or at least in
great tension. Nevertheless, until now at
any rate, we have tried to honor both
sets. We should continue to try to do so.

V.
If a right to PAS were
established, it would only apply
to the terminally ill
Most proponents of the right to PAS
speak only of - and want us to think
only about - such a right for the
terminally ill. (Terminal illness is
commonly defined as a condition that
will produce death "imminently" or
"within a short time" or in six months.)
Such advocacy is quite understandable.
A proposal to legalize PAS, but to limit
that right to the terminally ill, causes less
alarm and commands more general
support than would a proposal to
establish a broader right to assisted
suicide. A proposal to permit only
terminally ill patients to enlist the aid of
physicians to commit suicide is attractive
because it leads the public to believe that
adoption of such a proposal would
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constitute only a slight deviation from
traditional standards and procedures.
And, as Justice Frankfurter once
observed, "the function of an advocate is
to seduce."
But there are all sorts of reasons why
life may seem intolerable to a reasonable
person. To argue that suicide is plausible
or understandable in order to escape
intense physical pain or to end a
physically debilitated life but for no
other reason is to show oneself out of
touch with the depth and complexity of
human motives.
A few proponents of assisted suicide
have taken the position that it would be
arbitrary to exclude from coverage
persons with incurable but not terminally
ill progressive illnesses, for example, a
person in the early stages of Alzheimer'.s
disease. But why stop there? Is it any less
arbitrary to exclude the quadriplegic? The
victim of a paralytic stroke? One afflicted
with severe arthritis? The disfigured
survivor of a fire? The mangled survivor
of a road accident? One whose family has
been wiped out in an airplane crash?
If personal autonomy and the
termination of suffering are supposed to
be the touchstones for physician-assisted
suicide, why exclude those with nonterminal illnesses or disabilities who
might have to endure greater pain and
suffering for much longer periods of time
than those who are expected to die in the
next few weeks or months? If the
terminally ill do have a right to assisted
suicide, doesn't someone who must
continue to live what she considers an
intolerable or unacceptable existence for
many years have an equal - or even
greater - right to assisted suicide?
If a competent person comes to the
unhappy but firm conclusion that her
existence is unbearable and freely, clearly
and repeatedly requests assisted suicide,
and there is a constitutional right to some
form of assisted suicide, why should she
be denied the assistance of another to
end her life just because she does not
"qualify" under somebody else'.s
standards? Isn't this an arbitrary
limitation of self-determination and
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personal autonomy? As Daniel Callahan
has observed: "How can self-determination
have any limits?" If a person is mentally
competent and determined to commit
suicide with the assistance of another,
why aren't her desires or motives whatever they may be - sufficient?
There is another reason I very much
doubt that a right to assisted suicide
could or would be limited to the
terminally ill for very long - the analyses
of the two federal appellate courts that
handed down the "right to die" decisions
I have discussed earlier. Both the Second
and Ninth Circuits seemed to share the
view of proponents of assisted suicide
who insist that there is no principled
difference in terms of constitutional
doctrine and precedent between the
alleged right to assisted suicide and the
established right to terminate life support.
The problem is that the right to reject
life-sustaining treatment has not been
limited to the terminally ill.
One need only recall the Elizabeth
Bouvia case, which arose a decade ago.
At the time of the litigation, Ms. Bouvia,
a young woman afflicted with severe
cerebral palsy, had a long life expectancy.
Nor was she unconscious or mentally
impaired. Indeed, the court described her
as both "intelligent" and "alert."
Nevertheless, she was granted the relief
she sought - the right to remove a
nasogastric tube keeping her alive against
her wishes.
To be sure, neither the Bouvia case nor
other cases upholding the right of nonterminally ill persons to reject lifesustaining treatment were decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court. But Bouvia and
these other cases have been well received
by bioethicists and medico-legal
commentators. As Professor Alan Meisel
pointed out in the new edition of his
treatise on the "right to die," "the right of
a competent person to refuse medical
treatment is virtually absolute." If so, and
if there is no significant distinction
between "letting die" and active
intervention to bring about death, how
can the latter right be limited to the
terminally ill?

A Final Remark
Four decades ago, Glanville Williams,
a leading proponent of assisted suicide
and euthanasia, admitted that he
"prepared for ridicule" whenever he
described these practices as "medical
operations" or "medical procedures."
"Regarded as surgery," he acknowledged,
these practices are "unique, since [their]
object is not to save or prolong life but
the reverse." Today, few people chuckle
when PAS is classified as a medical
procedure - or even when it is called a
"health care right."
As my former colleague Robert Burt
recently observed, at a time when tens of
millions of Americans lack adequate
health care and Congress has refused to
do anything about it, it would be most
ironic if the judiciary were to select PAS
as "the one health care right that deserves
constitutional status."
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